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Abstract This paper analyses the nature of the relationship between risk and
responsibility. Since neither the concept of risk nor the concept of responsibility has
an unequivocal deﬁnition, it is obvious that there is no single interpretation of their
relationship. After introducing the different meanings of responsibility used in this
paper, we analyse four conceptions of risk. This allows us to make their link with
responsibility explicit and to determine if a shift in the connection between risk and
responsibility can be outlined. (1) In the engineer’s paradigm, the quantitative
conception of risk does not include any concept of responsibility. Their relationship
is indirect, the locus of responsibility being risk management. (2) In Mary Douglas’
cultural theory, risks are constructed through the responsibilities they engage.
(3) Rayner and (4) Wolff go further by integrating forms of responsibility in the
deﬁnition of risk itself. Analysis of these four frameworks shows that the concepts
of risk and responsibility are increasingly intertwined. This tendency is reinforced
by increasing public awareness and a call for the integration of a moral dimension in
risk management. Therefore, we suggest that a form of virtue-responsibility should
also be integrated in the concept of risk.
Keywords Risk   Responsibility   Models of risk   Cultural theory   Virtue
Introduction
With the development of new technologies and their associated risks, the questions
of risk and responsibility have found a major place in ethical debates. These issues
emerged with the introduction of nuclear technologies and are now exacerbated by
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DOI 10.1007/s11948-010-9246-yemerging technologies such as bio- or nanotechnologies, which involve not only
calculable risks but also ‘‘unknown’’ risks i.e. uncertainty and ignorance in the sense
of Stirling (1998). As Anthony Giddens puts it, in ‘‘a world dominated by
manufactured rather than external uncertainty, there is a renewed discussion of the
nature of responsibility’’; there is a ‘‘crisis of responsibility, because the connections
between risk, responsibility and decisions alter’’ (Giddens 1999, pp. 7–8). This crisis
requires us more than ever to study the link between the concepts of risk and
responsibility. Quite surprisingly in this context, even if much attention has been
paid to the notions of risk and responsibility, the link between these two concepts
has not often been analyzed.
1
At ﬁrst glance, this link might seem obvious: someone needs to be held
responsible—in fact, liable—for a risk when it ‘‘materializes’’, that is, in case some
damage occurs. However, if we take a closer look, the picture is much more
complex, both from an empirical and a theoretical perspective. The purpose of this
paper is to analyse, at the conceptual level, how these two evidently political and
controversial notions are related.
Since neither risk nor responsibility has an unequivocal deﬁnition, it is obvious
that there is no single interpretation of their relationship. In order to analyse the
nature of their link, four conceptions of risk will be analyzed. This will allow us to
clarify their link with responsibility and to determine if a shift in the connection
between risk and responsibility can be outlined.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we will brieﬂy review the conceptions of
responsibility that will be used in the paper. Then we will consider the notion of risk
as deﬁned technically in the standard engineer’s paradigm. Next we will consider an
anthropological standpoint, through the analysis of Mary Douglas’ research about
risk as a cultural process. Afterwards we will introduce the models of two authors
who integrate different notions of responsibility in the concept of risk itself:
Rayner’s polythetic concept of risk and Wolff’s multi-level model of risk. A
discussion section will follow, where the different conceptions will be analyzed and
compared.
Conceptions of Responsibility
Before introducing the various conceptions of risk, it is useful to review the
different meanings of responsibility that will be referred to in this paper: role-
responsibility, causal-responsibility, liability-responsibility, capacity-responsibility,
blame and virtue-responsibility.
Distinctions between role-responsibility, causal-responsibility, liability-respon-
sibility and capacity-responsibility have been established by Herbert Hart (2008,
pp. 212–222). These can be brieﬂy deﬁned as follows.
Role-responsibility is linked to a speciﬁc position to which particular duties are
attached. For example, a pilot is responsible for the ﬂight of his aircraft, or parents
1 At least not at the theoretical level. However there are several exceptions, for example the works of
Hans Lenk. See amongst others (Lenk and Maring 2001) or (Lenk 2007).
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leaving them alone in a car.
2
Causal-responsibility refers to the cause, understood in a quasi-mechanical sense,
of an event. The storm is responsible for the plane crash, or the heat is responsible
for the death of the baby left alone in a car.
Capacity-responsibility refers to the capacity of an agent to fulﬁl his responsi-
bilities. Being responsible for his/her own actions implies having the capacity of
understanding, reasoning and controlling the conduct. If the pilot has a heart attack,
he is not responsible for the plane crash.
Liability-responsibility is the legal facet of responsibility. It is a retrospective
form of responsibility that answers the questions of who will have to be punished,
who will have to explain the unwanted event, and/or who will have to pay
compensation for the damages. If someone has a car accident because he/she is
driving while drunk, he/she is liable to pay for the damages.
Besides these meanings of responsibility introduced by Hart, the paper will also
refer to blame insofar as the notion of responsibility is sometimes used in the
meaning of blameworthiness. Blame occurs when there is violation of a moral norm
and when someone’s behaviour is morally culpable (Wolff 2006, pp. 418–419). It
implies (1) that the agent has capacity-responsibility, (2) that he/she has done
something wrong and (3) that he/she is causally responsible for the harmful event
(Johnson 2005, p. 1617). For example, blame is at stake when someone has
committed an act of sabotage or of terrorism.
Finally, virtue-responsibility is used in the sense of moral responsibility
developed by John Ladd, as a form of responsibility which refers to moral
deﬁciency and not just to fault (Ladd 1991, pp. 85–89)—for example, the absence of
care or concern for the welfare of others. Responsibility is here a question of
relationship, where the agent does something that affects someone else. This
relationship describes ‘‘how things are and how things should be or should have
been’’ (Ladd 1991, p. 86). It is thus both descriptive and normative, and both
prospective and retrospective. Ladd illustrates this notion of virtue-responsibility
with the case of the Bhopal accident: even if no one was really at fault, safety was
not a priority of the management. This situation expresses an absence of care for
people at risk, which has to be understood as an absence of virtue-responsibility.
Risk and Responsibility in the Engineer’s Paradigm
In technical risk analysis, risk is most commonly deﬁned as the statistical
expectation value of unwanted events, which may or may not occur (Hansson 2004,
p. 10). For instance the European Commission’s report dedicated to the harmoni-
sation of risk assessment procedures suggests that ‘‘risk is widely recognized as a
function of the probability and severity of an adverse effect/event occurring to man
2 This is the meaning which is used in this paper even though Hart uses also the notion of
role-responsibility for qualifying someone as responsible when he/she takes his/her duties seriously
(a ‘‘responsible person’’).
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(European Commission 2000, p. 18). In the same view, the National Research
Council, on the one hand, deﬁnes hazard as ‘‘an act or phenomenon posing potential
harm to some person(s) or thing(s); the magnitude of the hazard is the amount of
harm that might result, including the seriousness and the number of people
exposed’’ and, on the other hand, it deﬁnes risk as a concept adding ‘‘to the hazard
and its magnitude the probability that the potential harm or undesirable
consequences will be realized’’ (National Research Council 1989, p. 321). In other
words, risk corresponds to ‘‘the combined answers to (1) What can go wrong? (2)
How likely is it? (3) What are the consequences?’’ (National Research Council
2009). This conception was also the one adopted in the seventies by engineers such
as Chauncey Starr or William Lowrance, pioneers in systematizing risk accept-
ability rules (Starr et al. 1976, pp. 640–664; Lowrance 1976, p. 8).
These deﬁnitions used in risk analysis reveal clearly a consensus about the
‘‘essence’’ of risk, which refers to a mode of representation of events explicitly
based on probabilities. This standpoint assumes a reiﬁed conception of risk,
considered as a characteristic of the risky technology and excluding the perceiving
subject.
At ﬁrst glance, the link between this strictly quantitative conception of risk and
the notion of responsibility may seem tenuous. Indeed, as many philosophers have
pointed out, this deﬁnition of risk is totally disconnected from the risk actors—see
for example (Bourg and Schlegel 2001, pp. 37–38)—and is thus also disconnected
from the allocation of responsibilities. Hence the concept of risk used in the
engineer’s paradigm does not inherently integrate any notion of responsibility.
However, even if the notions of risk and responsibility are conceptually distinct
in this framework, we cannot say that they are mutually exclusive. Indeed, they do
relate to each other in the risk management process. More precisely, according to
the engineer’s paradigm, the traditional risk management scheme distinguishes in
principle two phases: risk assessment and risk management in itself (Lowrance
1976, p. 8 and pp. 75–76). The ﬁrst is supposed to deal with questions of ‘‘facts’’; it
consists in the identiﬁcation and the quantiﬁcation of risk. The second, on the other
hand, concerns the acceptability of risk and its societal management. Thus it
involves questions of ‘‘values’’.
3 The risk assessment phase does not leave any room
for questions of responsibility of any type, which are transferred to the risk
management stage where several notions of responsibility are strongly embedded.
When an unwanted event has occurred, liability-responsibility is at stake: the focus
is on trying to ﬁnd out who has to ‘‘pay’’ for the damages. As liability-responsibility
implies capacity-responsibility and causal-responsibility as preconditions, both of
these are thus indirectly at stake here too (Van de Poel 2010). Role-responsibility is
also invoked in case an unwanted event occurs insofar as attention is paid to the way
the different individuals involved in the accident have or have not fulﬁlled their
duties.
3 The separation between risk assessment and management has often been challenged for several reasons,
as well as the fact/value dichotomy. See for example (Shrader-Frechette 1991, pp. 39–46) or (Silbergeld
1991).
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risk and the notion of responsibility is only indirect, the locus of responsibility being
risk management.
Risk Selection and Responsibility Allocation in Cultural Theory
In the eighties, the British anthropologist Mary Douglas drastically renewed the way
risk and responsibility are conceived. Indeed, in her very controversial book, Risk
and Culture—written with Aaron Wildavsky—, Douglas applies cultural theory to
the question of risk in modern societies, introducing thereby a constructed concept
of risk (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982).
As a reminder, cultural theory was developed by the anthropologist through the
study of primitive societies. Its basic hypothesis states that cultural biases and social
organizations mutually maintain each other.
4 To put it in another way, each cultural
bias performs a function of stabilization of the corresponding social organization,
which is typical of the functionalist tradition in sociology. In Cultural bias, Mary
Douglas deﬁnes four types of social organizations: the hierarchical, the insulated,
the individualistic and the egalitarian forms (Douglas 1979).
5 Each social
organization—or social form—can be characterized speciﬁcally. In hierarchical
forms, the social roles are clearly speciﬁed and the related distribution of resources
is often inequitable. In insulated forms, individuals do not have the possibility to
make personal transactions, their autonomy is minimal and their social roles are
completely determined by the individuals of other social forms. These insulated
individuals undergo their life passively; therefore they are sometimes called
‘‘fatalists’’. In the case of individualistic forms, the conditions are strongly
competitive and individual autonomy is important. Finally, in egalitarian forms, the
roles are not deﬁned and the fundamental social constraints are related to the
protection, by the group, of the outside border against foreigners (‘‘outsiders’’) and
to the control exercised in the name of the group over the behaviour of individuals.
As each social organization is maintained by a cultural bias covering the whole
cognitive and axiological content, it is also sustained by a particular set of risks
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). More precisely, ‘‘the question is not which dangers
are most alarming but which explanations of misfortune are likely to function most
effectively’’ in the different kinds of social organizations, that is which explanations
of misfortune are the most effective in maintaining the social organization (Douglas
1985, p. 59). It is thus not surprising that the risks that are focused on vary from one
social organization to another. In hierarchical forms, the prevailing shared fear is the
4 The concept of cultural bias designates here the beliefs, the values, as well as the ways to perceive the
world and to react to it. On the other hand, the notion of social organization deals only with the
interpersonal relationship patterns. It designates a group or a network of individuals, who share the same
social characteristics, and not a society as a whole.
5 The four types of social organizations are constructed according two dimensions, group and grid. Group
represents the level of social incorporation of the individual in a social unit while grid integrates the
institutionalized classiﬁcations, which regulate the interactions of members of any social structure.
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such as riots and wars.
6 In insulated forms, the individuals do not have—by
deﬁnition—the possibility to manage their own life and thus they are not able to
manage the risks they face. Therefore they do not care about risks. In individualistic
forms, the risk that is emphasized is the collapse of the market. Finally, the risks
highlighted in egalitarian forms are those that conﬂict with their demand for purity,
such as environmental pollution or technological risks, both seen as external threats.
Cultural theory considers that each cultural bias has a propensity to focus on a
particular type of danger—among the multiple surrounding dangers—and to neglect
others. In other words, each cultural bias selects the dangers that contribute to the
stabilization of the corresponding social organization, thereby ‘‘translating’’ these
into risks. Risks are thus constructed according to a social process in which
individuals are involved as active subjects: a risk does not only characterise an
element of the external world—a danger—but results from the interaction between
social processes and, possibly, the external world.
In a later book, Risk according to social sciences, Mary Douglas further analyzes
the process of risk selection, revealing a link between risk selection and
responsibility allocation (Douglas 1985). Hence she investigates the procedures of
responsibility and blame allocation.
From a functionalist perspective, these procedures vary according to the type of
social organization. More speciﬁcally, in insulated forms, individuals do not seek to
allocate responsibility or blame. Indeed, as they do not care about risks, they do not
need to ﬁnd someone to blame or to hold responsible in case an accident occurs. On
the other hand, hierarchies tend to blame the victims or their relatives in order to
assure internal social control. Egalitarian societies concentrate rather on ‘‘outsiders’’
in order to increase the loyalty to the group. In both of these cases, the focus is on
the reinforcement of the social cohesion. In individualist organizations, the logic of
individual competition tends to attribute one’s own misfortune to luckier or more
talented rivals. Therefore, individuals are claiming responsibilities rather than
blaming others for what happened, which is another way to maintain the system
(Douglas 1985, pp. 62–63).
Public allocation of blame and responsibility contributes thus to the stabilization
of social organizations. According to Douglas, this allocation is associated with the
advertising of certain kinds of risks (Douglas 1985, p. 56). To put it in another way,
the cultural processes that lead to a focus on certain kinds of dangers corresponds to
the cultural processes that allocate blame and responsibility (Douglas 1985,p .5 3
and 72). Responsibility and blame play thus a role as important as risk in this
functionalist framework.
The link between risk and responsibility in Douglas’ cultural theory is thus
established in a more direct way compared with the engineer’s paradigm: in this
case, these concepts are inseparable insofar as the notion of risk is constructed
through the cultural processes of responsibility and blame allocation.
6 To understand how Douglas establishes which risks are focused on in each social organization, see
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1982).
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In the late eighties, Steve Rayner, whose works were heavily inﬂuenced by cultural
theory, explicitly rejected the quantitative deﬁnition of risk typical of the engineers’
paradigm. He criticizes its essentialist character, which implies that, as soon as there
is an agreement on which consequences are unwanted, the factors of probability and
magnitude are necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for stating that something is
deﬁned as a risk and for determining it. Thereby other factors that might be relevant
are considered as being only ‘‘by-products’’ instead of inherent parts of risk. It is in
this perspective that Rayner proposes to rethink the epistemological status of risk,
trying to determine which type of deﬁnition would be the most appropriate (Rayner
and Cantor 1987, pp. 3–5; Rayner 1987, pp. 208–210).
With this goal in mind, Rayner refers to the notion of ‘‘open concept’’, introduced
by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical investigations (Wittgenstein, 1953). As a
reminder, Wittgenstein exempliﬁes this kind of concept through the notion of game:
the concept of game cannot be caught by an essentialist deﬁnition, as it is impossible
to ﬁnd particular characteristics that would be common to all games. Therefore he
proposes to consider the concept of game as an open—or polythetic—concept. It
consists in considering the concept as a chain of elements, which do not need to
have common characteristics from the one end of the chain to the other. Rather they
need only to present some similarities.
7 It is as a polythetic concept that Rayner
conceptualizes technological risk, the different standpoints—experts’ from different
disciplines and lay people’s—constituting the links of the conceptual chain.
More speciﬁcally, Rayner suggests that, when dealing with risk, lay people are
giving more importance to the notions of trust, liability and consent (Rayner 1992,
pp. 94–96). This leads him to formulate a new deﬁnition of risk:
R ¼ð P   MÞþð T   L   CÞ
where P = probability of occurrence of the adverse event; M = magnitude of the
adverse consequences; T = trust put in the institutions regulating the technology;
L = acceptability of the principle used to apportion liabilities; C = acceptability of
the procedure by which collective consent is obtained.
The ﬁrst term of this deﬁnition (P 9 M), corresponds to the ‘‘scientiﬁc end’’ of
the conceptual chain, and the second term (T 9 L 9 C), to its ‘‘societal end’’—the
principles of trust, liability and consent may vary according to the cultural context.
8
Far from being as univocal as risk in the engineer’s paradigm, the model
proposed by Rayner explicitly integrates in the deﬁnition of risk itself moral and
political dimensions such as trust, consent, but also liability.
7 For example, there are no common characteristics between football, cricket, chess or solitaire, but there
are some similarities. Indeed, cricket and football are two games where two teams are facing each other
with a ball on a ground, but their rules differ. Their common denominator with chess is their competitive
characteristic, which is irrelevant in the case of solitaire. On the other hand, chess and solitaire both
consist in moving pieces on a board, and so on.
8 Paradoxically, even if Rayner explicitly rejects the technical deﬁnition of risk for its essentialist
character, grasping the concept of risk with this formula seems nevertheless to presuppose some
essentialist notion.
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In 2006, Jonathan Wolff observes the limitations of quantiﬁed risk assessment,
which he considers to be inadequate for capturing all societal concerns (Wolff
2006). As well as Rayner, he considers the deﬁnition of risk used in the engineer’s
paradigm as insufﬁcient. Indeed, probabilities and hazards are unsatisfactory for an
effective risk analysis insofar as two hazards with the same magnitude are not
necessarily equal: one can be worse than another because it generates greater fear or
moral concern, for example (Wolff 2006, p. 418). It is in this perspective that Wolff
constructs a new model of risk called the ‘‘anatomy of risk’’. Besides probability
and magnitude, it integrates several other factors in the deﬁnition of risk itself:
cause, fear and moral concern.
Wolff considers ﬁrst the cause of the hazard, i.e. ‘‘the process by which the
hazard comes into being, or is sustained, or perhaps, permitted’’ (Wolff 2006,
p. 418). Implicitly, he refers thus to a causal conception of responsibility.
Wolff also observes that safety policies take into account subjective risks rather
than quantiﬁed ‘‘objective’’ risks. Safety policy implicitly gives the priority to the
reduction of fear rather than to the reduction of quantiﬁed risk. The role of fear in
the setting of safety policies appears thus to be undeniable.
However, when judging risks, moral concern appears to play an even greater role
than fear. People tend to focus on ‘‘morally blameworthy behaviours’’ and to reject
them. These behaviours can be classiﬁed in four categories: malice, recklessness,
negligence and incompetence. ‘‘Malice is to set out a course of action with the
deliberate aim of imposing harm or risks to people. Recklessness is to act knowing
that it could cause harm or risk, but not taking this properly into account in deciding
whether to act. Negligence is to fail to consider whether or not your action carries
risks to others, when such risks were reasonably foreseeable. Incompetence, in this
context, is to carry out a proper risk assessment and decide to take appropriate
action, but fail to do so’’ (Wolff 2006 pp. 418–419). When blaming people who
behave with malice, recklessness, negligence or incompetence, several forms of
responsibility are indirectly at stake insofar as blame implies capacity-responsibil-
ity, causal-responsibility, as well as the fact that the agent has done something
wrong—which might in turn be linked to role-responsibility and/or liability-
responsibility. As in the case of fear, blame drastically inﬂuences people’s attitudes
towards risks.
Another moral reaction consists in the shame individuals might feel when they
identify themselves with the actors at the origin of an adverse event or when they
feel partly responsible for the event (Wolff 2006, p. 425).
The originality of the model introduced by Wolff lies in its multi-level variables:
he distinguishes primary variables—probability, hazard and cause—from secondary
variables—fear, blame and shame—, which are taking the primary ones as objects.
Fear is attached to hazard and probability whereas blame and shame are associated
with cause, hazard, or probability. If shame and blame are not at stake, the
introduction of cause as a primary variable appears to be useless and the technical
deﬁnition of risk is valid. Wolff is conscious of the fact that more secondary
variables—and maybe even tertiary variables (such as regret that something is the
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However, he does not investigate this lead further.
As Rayner, Wolff systematically takes into account, in his conception of risk, a
certain number of sociocultural values, which refer to the concept of responsibility,
mainly through the introduction of the notions of cause, blame and—to a lesser
degree—shame.
9
Discussion
If we accept, with Paul Thompson, a contextual conception of risk (Thompson and
Dean 1996), we have to admit that risk may include a value-laden component as
well as a quantitative component. In this perspective, Douglas’, Rayner’s and
Wolff’s conceptions of risk are more relevant than the quantitative conception of
risk used in the engineer’s paradigm, which is not conceptually connected to social
values, and hence not to the notion of responsibility.
Douglas’ conceptions of risk and responsibility appear to be attractive and
original. She clearly has been a pioneer in moving the concepts of risk and
responsibility forward. Indeed she is the ﬁrst author to link these concepts: adopting
a culturalist/functionalist perspective, she considers that, in order to maintain social
coherence, risks are constructed through the responsibilities and the blames they
engage. This leads to the question of determining if a ‘‘risk’’, which does not imply
responsibility or blame, is still considered as a ‘‘risk’’ by Douglas. Implicitly, her
answer is negative. Indeed, because it does not play any stabilizing role, it is not
selected as a ‘‘risk’’ anymore—in Douglas’ sense—but it is considered as a danger.
The relationship between risk and responsibility is thus much stronger in Douglas’
theory than in the engineer’s paradigm, even though the connection between these
two notions is still indirect and unclear.
We can criticize Douglas for the confused nature of her text, which includes
many extrapolations, notably when she describes how the procedures of blame and
responsibility allocation work. Another criticism of Douglas’ view of risk in
relationship to responsibility comes from the fact that the culturalist framework
appears to be too rigid. With the variety of risk and responsibility problems that are
nowadays at stake, it is difﬁcult to support the idea that there are only three different
ways—according to the three main cultural biases—to conceptualize these notions
and their links. Finally, Douglas only focuses on two particular types of
responsibility—blame and moral responsibility—which is a choice that can be
questioned. She could indeed have enlarged her analysis to other dimensions of
responsibility such as liability.
Steve Rayner’s model is the ﬁrst one which attempts to formalize the link
between risk and responsibility: Rayner integrates the notion of liability in the
deﬁnition of risk itself, through the formula: R = (P 9 M) ? (T 9 L 9 C).
9 The importance attached to the notion of blame inevitably brings us back to Douglas’ works. However,
here the notion of blame does not play a functionalist role. Rather it refers to ethical and political values,
in a framework focused on citizens’ demands.
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empirically quantify the T, L and C components and in which units to express
these.
10 Moreover, we can assume that the units of the different variables in this
formula are heterogeneous. This raises the question of how the variables should be
combined. Further analysis would be required to solve this problem. In the
meantime, stating that risk is a function of these ﬁve variables would be more
cautious: R = f (P, M, T, L, C).
Wolff offers another perspective. Indeed, we have seen how Wolff introduces
several notions linked to the concept of responsibility—cause, blame and shame—in
his model of risk. His conception of risk might be formalized as R = f (P, H, C, F,
B, S…), where P = probability, H = hazard, C = cause, F = fear,B = blame, and
S = shame. More precisely, R = f (F, B, S), with F = f (P, H), B = f (P, H, C), and
S = f (P, H, C). As in the conception of risk elaborated by Rayner, the notions of
risk and responsibility are here inherently intertwined.
The successive introduction of these four models illustrates a clear will to
associate the notions of risk and responsibility more systematically. In fact, this
development can be understood in a broader perspective: the focus on responsibility
reﬂects more generally the citizens’ demand for integration of some moral
dimension into risk management, which arises from the multiple recent scandals—
for example the asbestos scandal, the BSE epidemic, or, more recently, the ﬁnancial
crisis or the environmental disaster in the Gulf of Mexico caused by the BP oil
spill—and from the resulting loss of trust in decision makers and experts.
With the recent focus on the need to preserve the environment and with the
development of emerging technologies such as bio- or nanotechnologies, an
increasingly greater part of the public is not only expecting that scientists and
decision-makers behave responsibly in their choices—responsibly understood in a
retrospective way. The public are also demanding that experts and decision-makers
behave in a responsible way, understood in a moral and prospective sense: an
attitude of care for others is at the centre of their expectations. Therefore, we
suggest that the integration in the concept of risk of the retrospective forms of
responsibility proposed by Rayner—liability-responsibility—and Wolff—cause,
blame and shame—is insufﬁcient. Another form of responsibility should also be
introduced as a dimension of the concept of risk, that is, John Ladd’s virtue-
responsibility deﬁned in section ‘‘Conceptions of responsibility’’ (Ladd 1991).
Of course, this suggestion does not solve the more general problems of the
determination of the factors that have to be included in the concept of risk and how
these have to be combined. Indeed, besides Rayner and Wolff, many authors have
advocated other conceptions of risk, where different values are at stake. For
example, Hansson stresses aspects such as equity, rights, intention, etc. (Hansson
2005, p. 1097). However, the discussion about which dimensions to take into
account falls beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, we advocate a concept of
risk which is formalized as R = f(X1, X2, … Xn), where Xi are the different variables
that have to be considered and n is the number of these variables. Among these
10 Steve Rayner does not specify how T, L and C have to be taken into account. We suppose T, L and C
are deﬁned as the inverse of the respective acceptabilities and trust.
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responsibility have to be included. To these, we add the notion of virtue-
responsibility, which is both retrospective and prospective.
Conclusion
Even if the technical conception of risk used in the engineer’s paradigm remains
operational and powerful at the risk quantiﬁcation stage, the introduction of new
conceptions of risk indicates that risk and responsibility are increasingly connected.
This paper suggests that several forms of responsibility should be integrated in the
concept of risk, that is, liability-responsibility, causal-responsibility, blame, shame,
capacity-responsibility, role-responsibility as well as virtue-responsibility.
Over the years, the understanding of this ﬁeld has improved but has also become
more complex. There are two ways to progress our knowledge. The ﬁrst would be to
work on new dimensions to be integrated into the concept of risk. The second would
take as a base forms of responsibility connected to the concept of risk discussed
above and would work out how these notions are linked together and how they can
practically be applied. This would allow consolidating existing knowledge in order
to improve understanding and efﬁciency in this ﬁeld.
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